



CLERK OF THE COURT

1 ASHCRAFT & BARR | LLP
2 JEFFREY F. BARR, ESQ.
3 Nevada Bar No. 7269
4 barrj@AshcraftBarr.com
5 2300 West Sahara Avenue
6 Suite 800
7 Las Vegas, NV 89102
8 Telephone: (702) 631.7555
9 Facsimile: (702) 631.7556

7 ERIC C. RASSBACH, ESQ.*
8 erassbach@becketfund.org
9 LORI H. WINDHAM, ESQ.*
10 lwindham@becketfund.org
11 DIANA M. VERM, ESQ.*
12 dverm@becketfund.org
13 1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW, Ste. 700
14 Washington, DC 20036
15 Attorneys for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
16 *Pro Hac Vice applications pending

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

16 RUBY DUNCAN, an individual; RABBI
17 MEL HECHT, an individual; HOWARD
18 WATTS III, an individual; LEORA
19 OLIVAS, an individual; ADAM
20 BERGER, an individual,
21 *Plaintiffs,*

22 v.

23 STATE OF NEVADA EX REL, THE
24 OFFICE OF THE STATE TREASURER
25 OF NEVADA AND THE NEVADA
26 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; DAN
27 SCHWARTZ, NEVADA STATE
28 TREASURER, in his official capacity;
STEVE CANAVERO, INTERIM
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION, in his official capacity,
Defendants.

CASE NO. A-15-723703-C

DEPT. NO. XXIX

**MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR
AS AMICUS CURIAE**

ASHCRAFT & BARR | LLP
2300 WEST SAHARA AVE. • STE 800 • LAS VEGAS, NV 89102
702.631.7555 ASHCRAFTBARR.COM

1 This Motion to appear as Amicus is made and based upon the following Points and
2 Authorities, the papers and pleadings on file, and any hearing this Court may entertain at the
3 time of this matter.

4 DATED this 26th day of October 2015.

5 ASHCRAFT & BARR | LLP

6
7
8 /s Jeffrey F. Barr
9 JEFFREY F. BARR, ESQ.
10 barrj@AshcraftBarr.com
11 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 800
12 Las Vegas, NV 89102
13 Attorneys for Proposed Amicus Curiae
14 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty

15 **NOTICE OF MOTION**

16 TO: ALL PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL

17 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing Motion to appear
18 as Amicus for hearing in Department XXIX of the above-entitled Court, on the 2 day
19 of December, 2015 at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may
20 be heard.

21 DATED this 26th day of October 2015.

22 ASHCRAFT & BARR | LLP

23 /s Jeffrey F. Barr
24 JEFFREY F. BARR, ESQ.
25 barrj@AshcraftBarr.com
26 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 800
27 Las Vegas, NV 89102
28 Attorneys for Proposed Amicus Curiae
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty

1 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 This case challenges Nevada’s “Educational Savings Account Program” (“ESA Program”)
3 based on two provisions of Nevada’s constitution that invoke a notorious history of anti-
4 Catholic discrimination. The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty respectfully suggests that
5 this Court would be well served to allow the Becket Fund to appear as *amicus curiae* and
6 inform the Court about the historical and legal implications of adopting the interpretation of
7 the law the plaintiffs suggest.¹ The Becket Fund’s proposed amicus brief is attached to this
8 motion.
9

10 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty is a nonprofit, nonpartisan law firm dedicated to
11 protecting the free expression of all religious traditions and the equal participation of
12 religious people in public life and benefits. The Becket Fund has represented agnostics,
13 Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, Santeros, Sikhs, and Zoroastrians, among
14 others, in lawsuits across the country and around the world. The Becket Fund litigates in
15 support of religious liberty in state and federal courts throughout the United States as both
16 primary counsel and *amicus curiae*. The Becket Fund has recently obtained landmark
17 religious accommodation victories in the U.S. Supreme Court in *Holt v. Hobbs*, 135 S. Ct.
18 2751 (2015) (involving a Muslim prisoner seeking accommodation of a religiously-
19 mandated beard) and *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby*, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2014) (involving religious
20 objections to the Department of Health & Human Services’ contraception mandate).
21
22

23 Because it supports rights to equal participation for religious organizations, the Becket
24 Fund has participated for many years in litigation challenging the nineteenth century state
25
26

27 ¹ Amici informed counsel of record for the parties of this motion. Defendants consent to the
26 motion. Plaintiffs refused to grant consent.

1 constitutional provisions that single out religious people and institutions for special disfavor,
2 some of which are considered Blaine Amendments. These state constitutional amendments
3 arose during a shameful period when our national history that was tarnished by anti-Catholic
4 and anti-immigrant sentiment. They expressed and implemented that sentiment by excluding
5 all government aid from disfavored faiths (mainly Catholicism), while allowing those same
6 funds to support a “common” faith, a faith that is fairly described as a lowest common
7 denominator Protestantism. The Becket Fund resolutely opposes the application of these
8 state constitutional provisions to citizens today.

9
10
11 To that end, the Becket Fund has filed amicus briefs in states across the country and in the
12 Supreme Court to document in detail the history of these state constitutional provisions and
13 to protect the rights of children and their parents to be free from religion-based exclusion
14 from government educational benefits.

15 The Becket Fund trusts that the Proposed Brief of Amicus Curiae attached hereto as Exhibit
16 A, as well as the Becket Fund’s special expertise in this area of the law, will provide the
17 Court a historical perspective to aid it in the resolution of this case.

18
19 ASHCRAFT & BARR | LLP

20
21 /s Jeffrey F. Barr
22 JEFFREY F. BARR, ESQ.
23 Nevada Bar No. 7269
24 barrj@AshcraftBarr.com
25 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 800
26 Las Vegas, NV 89102
27 Attorneys for Proposed Amicus Curiae
28 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned does certify that on the 26th day of October 2015, the foregoing motion was served by way of the Eighth Judicial District's Wiznet online E-File & Serve Program on the following:

ACLU of Nevada**Contact**

Amy Rose
Shawn Meerkamper

Email

rose@aclunv.org
meerkamper@aclunv.org

Attorney General's Office**Contact**

Ketan D. Bhirud
Traci Plotnick

Email

kbhirud@ag.nv.gov
tplotnick@ag.nv.gov

Hutchison & Steffen**Contact**

Jacob A. Reynolds
Robert Stewart

Email

jreynolds@hutchlegal.com
RStewart@hutchlegal.com

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC**Contact**

Katie Parry

Email

kparry@hutchlegal.com

Institute for Justice**Contact**

Keith Diggs
Tim Keller

Email

kdiggs@ij.org
tkeller@ij.org

Institute for Justice**Contact**

Kileen Lindgren

Email

klindgren@ij.org

Sande Law Group**Contact**

April Rivera
Brian A. Morris
John P. Sande, IV
Sarah A. Morris

Email

april@sandelawgroup.com
bam@sandelawgroup.com
john@sandelawgroup.com
sam@sandelawgroup.com

/s Jeffrey F. Barr
An employee of ASHCRAFT & BARR

EXHIBIT A

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ASHCRAFT & BARR | LLP
JEFFREY F. BARR, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 7269
barrj@AshcraftBarr.com
2300 West Sahara Avenue
Suite 800
Las Vegas, NV 89102
Telephone: (702) 631.7555
Facsimile: (702) 631.7556

ERIC C. RASSBACH, ESQ.*
erassbach@becketfund.org
LORI H. WINDHAM, ESQ.**
lwindham@becketfund.org
DIANA M. VERM, ESQ.**
dverm@becketfund.org
1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW, Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20036
Attorneys for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
*Pro Hac Vice application forthcoming
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**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

RUBY DUNCAN, an individual;
RABBI MEL HECHT, an individual;
HOWARD WATTS III, an individual;
LEORA OLIVAS, an individual;
ADAM BERGER, an individual,
Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF NEVADA EX REL,
THE OFFICE OF THE STATE
TREASURER OF NEVADA AND
THE NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION; DAN SCHWARTZ,
NEVADA STATE TREASURER, in
his official capacity; STEVE
CANAVERO, INTERIM
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION, in his official
capacity,
Defendants.

CASE NO. A-15-723703-C

Dept. No. 29

**PROPOSED BRIEF OF AMICUS
CURIAE THE BECKET FUND
FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM**

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SUMMARY

Beginning in the mid-1800s, our nation experienced a shameful era of anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant bigotry. A homogenous majority, suspicious of a growing Catholic minority, gave birth to a movement that sought to suppress Catholics and immigrants through the political process. This movement—decried at the time by Abraham Lincoln and in modern times by the U.S. Supreme Court—unleashed religious discrimination at war with both founding-era and present-day understandings of religious liberty. Sadly, its legacy persists to this day in the form of “Blaine Amendments,” provisions adopted in numerous state constitutions in the late 1800s and early 1900s that were designed to suppress Catholic schools in favor of Protestant-dominated public schools. Today, Blaine Amendments often stand as the last available weapon for attacking democratically enacted, religion-neutral school choice programs.

That is precisely their role in this case. Both Nevada constitutional provisions which Plaintiffs rely upon contain the anti-Catholic characteristics of a Blaine Amendment. To claim that the Education Savings Account Program (ESA Program) funds “sectarian” purposes is simply a modern spin on the same discrimination that birthed the Blaine Amendments. A state law originally designed to harm one group does not shed its unconstitutionality by harming additional groups today. Use of the Nevada Blaine Amendment or the Common Schools provision to strike down the ESA Program would conflict with the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. It would also violate Nevada’s Ordinance and Enabling Act. Under the principle of constitutional avoidance, this Court should interpret sections 2 and 10 of Article

1
2 11 to avoid violating the Nevada or United States Constitution—which means the ESA
3 Program must be upheld.

4 **ARGUMENT**

5 **I. In order to avoid conflict with the United States Constitution, Nevada’s Blaine** 6 **Amendment and the Common Schools provision should be interpreted to** 7 **uphold the ESA Program.**

8 In seeking to invalidate the ESA Program, the Plaintiffs seek to resurrect long-dormant
9 provisions of the Nevada Constitution. But their interpretation of these provisions would
10 conflict with federal constitutional provisions that prohibit laws rooted in discrimination
11 against religious minorities.

12 The doctrine of constitutional avoidance must be applied in interpreting the Common
13 Schools provision and the Blaine Amendment. In *Mangarella v. State*, 117 Nev. 130, 134-
14 35, 17 P.3d 989, 992 (2001), the Nevada Supreme Court held that “[w]henver possible,”
15 Nevada courts “must interpret statutes so as to avoid conflicts with the federal or state
16 constitutions.” *Id.* Amicus does not address here the different possible interpretations of the
17 ESA Program under the Blaine Amendment and the Common Schools provision, but it is
18 clear that an interpretation of the Nevada Constitution that would invalidate the ESA
19 Program raises grave federal constitutional questions for two reasons: the Blaine Amendment
20 and the Common Schools provision raise the specter of anti-Catholic animus that has been
21 forbidden by the United States Constitution, and invalidating the ESA Program would result
22 directly in discriminatory treatment of Catholics and other religious believers today.
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2 **A. The no-aid provision is a Blaine Amendment enacted as a direct result of**
3 **anti-Catholic animus.**

4 Article 2, Section 10 was adopted as an amendment to the Nevada Constitution in 1880.
5 Modeled after a failed amendment attempted for the federal Constitution, it states “No public
6 funds of any kind or character whatever, State, County or Municipal, shall be used for
7 sectarian purpose.” Nev. Const. art. II, § 10. Unfortunately, as the Supreme Court has
8 recognized, laws like these have a “shameful pedigree” rooted in “pervasive hostility to the
9 Catholic Church and to Catholics in general.” *Mitchell v. Helms*, 530 U.S. 793, 828, 120 S.
10 Ct. 2530, 2551 (2000) (plurality). That history means that modern attempts to enforce these
11 provisions in a discriminatory manner will conflict with the federal constitution.
12

13 Anti-Catholic hostility arose in the mid-1800s as a wave of Catholic immigrants
14 threatened the longstanding Protestant dominance of public schools and other social
15 institutions. This hostility prompted an attempt by then-Speaker of the House James G.
16 Blaine to amend the federal constitution to prohibit any state funding of “sectarian” schools.
17 Though the federal Blaine Amendment was narrowly defeated in the Senate, its momentum
18 carried forward a wave of “anti-sectarian” funding provisions in state constitutions across
19 the country. Many states adopted their own Blaine Amendments, including Nevada. See
20 generally, Joseph P. Viteritti, *Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State*
21 *Constitutional Law*, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 657 (1998). These “state Blaine
22 Amendments” were a reactionary attempt to protect the dominant religious culture of
23 mainstream Protestantism by ensuring both that public schools would teach a certain brand
24 of Christianity, and that private Catholic schools—branded as “sectarian”—would not
25 receive state funding.
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1
2 The basic history of the Blaine Amendments and their basis in anti-Catholic bigotry is
3 well documented and widely accepted. See Defendants’ Mot. to Dismiss at 16-20. Indeed,
4 the Supreme Court has addressed that history in at least two opinions. First, in *Zelman v.*
5 *Simmons-Harris*, three dissenting Justices detailed the history of the Blaine Amendments at
6 length. 536 U.S. 639, 720-21, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2503-04 (2002) (dissenting opinion of Breyer,
7 J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.). Their historical account was not disputed by the
8 majority.
9

10 As they explained, “during the early years of the Republic, American schools—including
11 the first public schools—were Protestant in character. Their students recited Protestant
12 prayers, read the King James version of the Bible, and learned Protestant religious ideals.”
13 *Id.* at 720, 122 S. Ct. at 2503 (citing David Tyack, *Onward Christian Soldiers: Religion in*
14 *the American Common School*, in *History and Education* 217 (P. Nash ed. 1970)). But in the
15 mid-1800s, a wave of immigration brought significant religious strife. Catholics “began to
16 resist the Protestant domination of the public schools,” and “religious conflict over matters
17 such as Bible reading ‘grew intense,’ as Catholics resisted and Protestants fought back to
18 preserve their domination.” *Id.* (citing John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, *A Political*
19 *History of the Establishment Clause*, 100 *Mich. L. Rev.* 279, 300 (2001)). Finding that they
20 were unwelcome in public schools, “Catholics sought equal government support for the
21 education of their children in the form of aid for private Catholic schools.” *Id.* at 721, 122 S.
22 Ct. at 2504. Protestants insisted in response “that public schools must be ‘nonsectarian’
23 (which was usually understood to allow Bible reading and other Protestant observances).”
24 *Id.* And they insisted that “public money must not support ‘sectarian’ schools (which in
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2 practical terms meant Catholic.)” Id. (citing Jeffries & Ryan, 100 Mich. L. Rev. at 301). The
3 idea for the failed Blaine Amendment came as the Protestant position gained political power,
4 with the goal “to make certain that government would not help pay for ‘sectarian’ (i.e.,
5 Catholic) schooling for children.” Id. (citing Jeffries & Ryan, 100 Mich. L. Rev. at 301-05).

6
7 In *Mitchell v. Helms*, a four-Justice plurality similarly acknowledged and condemned the
8 religious animosity that gave rise to state Blaine Amendments. 530 U.S. at 828-29, 120 S.
9 Ct. 2551-52 (plurality op. of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy,
10 JJ.). As the Court explained, “Consideration of the [federal Blaine] amendment arose at a
11 time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an
12 open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code for ‘Catholic.’” Id. at 828, 120 S. Ct. at 2551. The
13 plurality concluded that “the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise
14 permissible aid programs”—the very purpose and effect of the state constitutional provisions
15 here—represented a “doctrine, born of bigotry, [that] should be buried now.” Id. at 829, 120
16 S. Ct. at 2552.

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19 In 1877, during Nevada’s first legislative session following the failed federal Blaine
20 Amendment, the Nevada legislature passed a “little Blaine Amendment,” which was later
21 adopted by the popular vote in a general election. Historical evidence—as presented by the
22 Defendants—shows that the same anti-Catholic bigotry that drove Speaker Blaine’s
23 unsuccessful federal amendment also drove Nevada’s Blaine Amendment. Then-Professor
24 Bybee and David Newton published an extensive account of the introduction of the Blaine
25 Amendment in Nevada that lays out the evidence of the anti-Catholic sentiment behind it.
26 Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, *Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little Blaine*

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2 *Amendment” and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs*, 2 Nev. L.J. 551,
3 561-65 (2002). As they explain, the primary motivation for Nevada’s Blaine Amendment
4 was to oppose an orphanage in Virginia City run by the Catholic Sisters of Charity that served
5 local children, particularly those who lost parents to the mines in Storey County. *Id.* at 561.
6 For several years leading up to the Blaine Amendment, the state legislature contributed funds
7 to support the Orphanage. *Id.* at 562-64. This support was controversial because of the
8 orphanage’s Catholicism. *Id.* One state representative called a bill supporting the orphanage
9 “the first step toward uniting Church and State.” *Id.* at 563 (internal quotations omitted).
10 Eventually, over objections to the Catholic orphanage, the state appropriated funds to
11 establish its own orphanage, and in the meantime continued to pass controversial bills to
12 support the Sisters of Charity orphanage. *Id.* at 565. The back-and-forth over whether the
13 state could fund the orphanage had grown so contentious that in 1873, Sister Frederica, the
14 head of the Sisters of Charity, requested the funding bill be withdrawn as a means of avoiding
15 further anti-Catholic sentiment. “[O]f late, a hostile feeling has risen against [the orphans].
16 If we are not entitled to the appropriation in justice, we do not look for it in charity.” *Id.* at
17 565 (internal quotations omitted).
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21 Once the Blaine Amendment was passed, the Nevada Daily Tribune celebrated the
22 provision for the effect it would have on Catholics in public life: “[T]his is a stepping stone
23 to the final breaking up of a power that has long cursed the world, and that is obtaining too
24 much of a foothold in these United States.” *Id.* at 566. The Tribune turned out to be at least
25 partially correct about the effect of the Blaine: it meant the downfall of the Sisters of Charity
26 and their orphanage. After the Blaine was passed, the state treasurer refused to release state
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2 funds to the Orphanage. The Orphanage sought a writ of mandamus from the Nevada
3 Supreme Court, and lost. In *State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock*, the Nevada
4 Supreme Court reasoned that the Blaine Amendment was meant to go farther than the
5 Common Schools provision, which was intended “to keep all sectarian instruction from the
6 schools.” 16 Nev. 373, 379 (1882). Indeed, as the orphanage was, “with one exception,” “the
7 only applicant for state aid, where the question of sectarianism could have been raised,” and
8 the Court was “strongly impressed with the idea that, in the minds of the people, the use of
9 public funds for the benefit of [the orphanage] and kindred institutions, was an evil which
10 ought to be remedied[.]” *Id.* at 380, 383. The orphanage closed in 1897. *Bybee & Newton*, 2
11 Nev. L.J. at 570. As *Bybee* and *Newton* have documented with broad support from primary
12 sources, the Blaine Amendment was supported by religious animosity towards Catholics,
13 and the Virginia City Catholic orphanage in particular.
14
15

16 **B. The Common Schools provision is tainted by anti-Catholic animus.**

17 Plaintiffs’ “Common Schools” claim under Article 11, Section 2 suffers from the same
18 anti-Catholic taint that plagues the Blaine Amendment. Though it was in place before the
19 federal Blaine Amendment was enacted, it contains all the relevant characteristics of a Blaine
20 Amendment and is—like the Blaine Amendment—an anti-Catholic provision. First, it was
21 passed during a time of sweeping anti-Catholic sentiment and with an intent to remove
22 Catholic influence on public schools, and second, it prohibits “sectarian” influences on
23 schools while leaving unharmed “generic” religious practices in public schools.
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26 At the time of Nevada’s constitutional convention, Nevada was not immune from the
27 notorious anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant sentiment that was sweeping the nation. “The
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2 movement to adopt ‘Little Blaine Amendments’ actually predated [the] call for a
3 constitutional amendment.” Bybee & Newton, 2 Nev. L.J. at 570. In 1864, Irish Catholic
4 immigrants had settled in Nevada mining towns and begun establishing institutions. James
5 S. Olson, Pioneer Catholicism in Eastern and Southern Nevada, 1864-1931, 26 Nev. Hist.
6 Soc’y Q. 159, 163 (1983). Conflict was already brewing between Catholic immigrants and
7 the rest of the population by the time of the constitutional convention. See *id.*

9 The record of the debates from the constitutional convention is evidence that the
10 Common Schools provision was intended to keep Catholic influence out of the public
11 schools. The convention was plagued with anti-Catholic sentiment. Delegates to the
12 constitutional convention explicitly discussed Catholics as a sectarian influence and
13 wondered if Section 2 could be read to prevent Catholic schools from existing even outside
14 the public school system. “Will the Chairman of the committee explain a little . . . ? Does
15 that mean they have no right to maintain Catholic schools, for example?” Official Report of
16 the Debates and Proceedings in the Constitutional Convention of the State of Nevada 568
17 (1866) (statement of Mr. Warwick).

20 Delegate Lockwood, hardly bothering to disguise his disgust for Catholics, said “I have
21 seen persons so bigoted in their religious faith—as, for example, the Roman Catholics,
22 although I do not mean to mention them invidiously—that they would claim that all the
23 public schools were sectarian, and rather allow their children to grow up in ignorance than
24 attend them.” *Id.* at 572 (Statement of Mr. Lockwood). Delegate Collins made it clear that
25 he was worried about Catholic encroachment: “I also hope, most sincerely, that we shall
26 provide in our Constitution for keeping out of our schools sectarian instruction. It will require
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2 strong influences to exclude such instruction, and money is the great motor.” Id. at 577
3 (Statement of Mr. Collins).

4 At the end of their deliberations, the Common Schools provision that the delegates
5 adopted possessed the key language of a Blaine Amendment: it prohibits “sectarian”
6 activities while allowing “non-sectarian” religious activities to continue, thereby prohibiting
7 Catholic influence in public schools but allowing Protestant influenced traditions to remain.
8 That reality played out in Nevada schools after the constitution was ratified and after the
9 Blaine Amendment was passed. This policy was reflected by the Superintendent of public
10 education in 1877, noting that though the law “prohibit[s] sectarianism,” it did not object to
11 “the reading of the Bible.” Defendants’ Exhibit 2 at 22. Indeed, the Pacific Coast Speller, the
12 textbook used in Nevada public schools, contained numerous Bible verses and theological
13 statements, instructing children in Protestant Christianity. See, e.g., Defendants’ Exhibit 3 at
14 87 (“The way of the transgressor is hard.”); id. at 90 (“Purify your heart of all evil thoughts.
15 No true Christian can be entirely hopeless.”); id. at 92 (“If ye fulfill the law according to the
16 Scriptures, ‘Thou shalt love they neighbor as thyself,’ ye do well.”). Thus the Common
17 Schools provision accomplished its goal of shoring up Protestant-dominated public schools
18 and prohibiting funding for similar Catholic schools. Because the Common Schools
19 provision contains the key characteristics of a Blaine Amendment, enforcing it in the
20 discriminatory manner the Plaintiffs propose would cause the same constitutional problems
21 that the Blaine Amendment raises.
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26 In light of the anti-Catholic animus that birthed the Nevada Blaine Amendment and the
27 Common Schools provision, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance strongly counsels this
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2 Court to avoid using those provisions to strike down the Education Savings Account
3 program. Nevada courts construe state laws to avoid state and federal constitutional
4 questions. *Mangarella*, 117 Nev. at 134-35, 17 P.3d at 992. The Blaine Amendment and the
5 Common Schools provision run afoul of the federal Constitution in at least three ways: they
6 violate the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.
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8 First, the provisions’ discriminatory treatment of religious groups—particularly under the
9 Plaintiffs’ preferred interpretation—violates the federal Establishment and Equal Protection
10 Clauses. Second, the hostility shown towards Catholics in the enactment of the Blaine
11 Amendment and the Common Schools provision implicates the Equal Protection Clause and
12 violates the neutrality standard of the Free Exercise Clause.

14 **C. Invalidating the ESA Program would create conflict with the Free Exercise 15 Clause.**

16 The Nevada Blaine Amendment and the Common Schools provision—particularly under
17 the Plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation—create serious conflicts with the federal Free
18 Exercise Clause, and would run directly counter to decisions of the United States Supreme
19 Court, other state supreme courts, and the federal courts of appeals. When laws impacting
20 religion are “not neutral or not of general application,” they are subject to strict scrutiny.
21 *Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah*, 508 U.S. 520, 546, 113 S. Ct.
22 2217, 2233 (1993).

24 The Nevada Blaine and the Common Schools provision are neither “neutral” nor
25 “generally applicable” because, as explained in detail above, their original purpose was to
26 target Catholic institutions. They cannot be neutral because “the minimum requirement of
27 neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 533, 113 S. Ct. at
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2 2227. But, as described above and recognized by the Supreme Court, the laws ban aid to
3 “sectarian” institutions, a pejorative term that was code for “Catholic.” The history of these
4 provisions confirms that interpretation. See supra Parts I.A. & I.B. In this respect, the Blaine
5 Amendment and the Common Schools provision are even more troubling than the ordinance
6 in Lukumi, which was passed with the object of suppressing Santería, but was neutral on its
7 face. *Id.* at 534-35, 113 S. Ct. at 2227-28.

9 In addition to the problem of facial neutrality, the Blaine Amendment and the Common
10 Schools provision also violate the Free Exercise Clause because they created a “religious
11 gerrymander,” an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices.”
12 *Id.* at 535 (quoting *Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of New York*, 397 U.S. 664, 696, 90 S.
13 Ct. 1409, 1425 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Specifically, they targeted Catholic religious
14 institutions, but left Protestant religious exercises in the public schools undisturbed. See
15 supra at 9. Plaintiffs would have that gerrymander persist today, in a slightly different form.
16 Under their reading of the Blaine Amendment and the Common Schools provision, Nevada’s
17 ESA Program would stand or fall based upon the “sectarian” nature of private schools
18 deemed “too religious.” See Compl. ¶¶ 35-81 (objecting to religious content of particular
19 private schools).

22 That is precisely the sort of distinction prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. The Tenth
23 Circuit struck down this type of distinction in *Colorado Christian Univ. v. Weaver*, 534 F.3d
24 1245 (10th Cir. 2008). There, a state scholarship program permitted students to use the funds
25 at religious schools, but excluded schools deemed “pervasively sectarian.” *Id.* at 1250. That
26 distinction violated both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses because it
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2 “discriminates among religions.” Id. A decision striking down the ESA Program because
3 some funds went to schools deemed “too religious” would likewise conflict with the Free
4 Exercise Clause.

5 This would be true even if the distinction was not based upon animus against particular
6 religious groups. The Third Circuit recently held that Plaintiffs could state a Free Exercise
7 claim based on the discriminatory impact of the government’s surveillance of Muslims.
8 Hassan v. City of New York, --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 5933354, *22 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2015).
9 That surveillance, according to Plaintiffs, was based upon their religion, without any further
10 evidence of wrongdoing. Id. Even without proving animus, “[t]he indignity of being singled
11 out [by a government] for special burdens on the basis of one’s religious calling” constitutes
12 an injury for First Amendment purposes. Id. at *6. In this case, even were one to take
13 Plaintiffs’ tendentious allegations about “public funds” as true, the rule they propose would
14 be flatly unconstitutional. Rather than choosing which religious groups to surveil based on
15 their degree of religiosity, courts would sit in judgment on the question of whether a school
16 is “too religious” a place for parents to choose to spend supposed “public funds,” thus
17 impermissibly ranking religious groups by the level of their religiosity.¹
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23 ¹ Plaintiffs have argued publicly that some religious institutions are immune from the Blaine
24 Amendment, while others are too religious to participate in this sort of program. This is an
25 arbitrary distinction. See Neal Morton, State Seeks Dismissal of Lawsuit Against Education
26 Savings Accounts, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Oct. 19, 2015, available at
27 [http://www.reviewjournal.com/education/state-seeks-dismissal-lawsuit-against-education-
28 savings-accounts-0](http://www.reviewjournal.com/education/state-seeks-dismissal-lawsuit-against-education-savings-accounts-0) (““Using Medicaid at a hospital that happens to be religiously affiliated
is completely different. They’re not providing indoctrination with their medicine,” she said,
noting many religious schools require prayer and scripture study.”) (quoting counsel for

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2 Nor could the constitutional conflict be resolved by interpreting the Blaine and the
3 Common Schools provision to exclude all religiously-affiliated institutions from receiving
4 ESA funds. That interpretation would far exceed the scope of permissible action under the
5 First Amendment. Again in *Weaver*, the Tenth Circuit explicitly emphasized that, while the
6 state might choose not to fund devotional theology degrees, that narrow limitation “does not
7 extend to the wholesale exclusion of religious institutions and their students from otherwise
8 neutral and generally available” programs. *Weaver*, 534 F.3d at 1255 (citing *Locke v. Davey*,
9 540 U.S. 712, 725, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (2004)). A ruling that no religiously-affiliated
10 institution could participate in the program—even through the independent private choices
11 of parents directing their own accounts—would have sweeping ramifications, rendering
12 religious individuals and institutions second-class citizens, and accomplishing a different
13 “religious gerrymander” within the state. *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 534, 133 S. Ct. at 2227; see
14 also *Locke*, 540 U.S. at 724, 124 S. Ct. at 1314 (laws “evinced . . . hostility toward religion”
15 are impermissible). For all these reasons, if the Blaine Amendment is construed to strike
16 down the ESA Program, then the Blaine Amendment must face strict scrutiny under the
17 federal constitution.
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21 Under *Lukumi*, the Blaine Amendment must therefore be subject to strict scrutiny, which
22 requires that a law must have a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly
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26 Plaintiffs). But this ignores that religious hospitals often employ chaplains and provide
27 spiritual care for their patients. See, e.g., *Dignity Health*, <https://www.dignityhealth.org/las-vegas/patients-and-visitors/spiritual-care> (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). This illustrates the
28 difficulty and sweeping impact of a decision limiting the ESA Program to schools deemed
religious, but not too religious.

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2 tailored to pursue that interest. *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 546, 113 S. Ct. at 2233; see also *Weaver*,
3 534 F.3d at 1266 (laws involving religious discrimination are subject to strict scrutiny, but
4 laws involving excessive entanglement are “unconstitutional without further inquiry”). But
5 there can be no compelling interest in prohibiting Nevada parents from using their ESA
6 accounts at schools run by disfavored religious groups. Since the United States Supreme
7 Court has upheld programs with even less private choice than the ESA Program, see *Zelman*,
8 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460, it is unlikely to find that Nevada has a “compelling” interest
9 in prohibiting parents from using their accounts at religious institutions.²

11 **D. Invalidating the ESA Program would create conflict with the Establishment**
12 **Clause.**

13 The effect of discriminating among religious groups—i.e., those considered “sectarian”
14 and those considered “non-sectarian”—also violates the Establishment Clause. “[N]o State
15 can pass laws which aid one religion or that prefer one religion over another.” *Larson v.*
16 *Valente*, 456 U.S. 228, 246, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1684 (1982) (citation omitted). Indeed, “neutral
17 treatment of religions [is] ‘[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause.’” *Weaver*,
18 534 F.3d at 1257 (citing *Larson*, 456 U.S. at 244, 102 S. Ct. at 1683).

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20 In *Weaver*, the Tenth Circuit applied this principle to find that the “‘pervasively’
21 sectarian” standard was unconstitutional, because it “exclude[d] some but not all religious
22 institutions” *Id.* at 1258. Similarly, in *Larson*, the Supreme Court struck down a state
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27 ² *Locke v. Davey* is not to the contrary. *Locke* expressly held that “[t]he State’s interest in
28 not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees” was only “substantial”—not compelling.
Locke, 540 U.S. at 725, 124 S. Ct. at 1315.

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2 law that imposed registration and reporting requirements upon only those religious
3 organizations that solicited more than fifty percent of their funds from nonmembers.
4 According to the Court, these requirements impermissibly distinguished between “well-
5 established churches,” which had strong support from their members, and “churches which
6 are new and lacking in a constituency,” which had to rely on solicitation from nonmembers.
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8 Larson, 456 U.S. at 246, 102 S. Ct. at 1684 n.23; see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 536, 113 S.
9 Ct. at 2228 (“differential treatment of two religions” might be “an independent constitutional
10 violation.”).

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12 In *Spencer v. World Vision, Inc.*, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a religious
13 ministry run as a nonprofit organization could claim the “religious employer” exemption
14 from Title VII even though it was not technically a church. The court agreed that it could,
15 explaining that “discrimination between institutions on the basis of the pervasiveness or
16 intensity of their religious beliefs” would be “constitutionally impermissible.” 633 F.3d 723,
17 729 (9th Cir. 2010) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks
18 omitted); see also *Univ. of Great Falls v. N.L.R.B.*, 278 F.3d 1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
19 (“[A]n exemption solely for ‘pervasively sectarian’ schools would itself raise First
20 Amendment concerns—discriminating between kinds of religious schools.”). That sort of
21 impermissible discrimination among religious organizations was exactly what the Blaine
22 Amendments were designed to do, and they continue to have that effect. That is a direct
23 violation of the Establishment Clause.
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26 The Plaintiffs’ preferred interpretation of the Nevada Blaine Amendment and the
27 Common Schools provision would also require this Court to issue an opinion in conflict with
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2 the Establishment Clause by “entangling itself” in religious questions. *Weaver*, 534 F.3d at
3 1263. Plaintiffs ask that the government determine whether religious schools have “sectarian
4 missions and goals,” and let the ESA Program stand or fall on that basis. See Compl. ¶¶ 6,
5 35-81. But “[i]t is well established . . . that courts should refrain from trolling through a
6 person’s or institution’s religious beliefs.” *Weaver*, 534 F.3d at 1261; see also *Spencer*, 633
7 F.3d at 731 (the “very act” of determining “what does or does not have religious meaning”
8 violates Establishment Clause). Here, the Plaintiffs suggest that courts should engage in
9 entangling inquiries such as the schools’ relationships with religious institutions, whether
10 their courses tend to indoctrinate or proselytize students, whether they require participation
11 in “worship,” and the beliefs and religious practices of students and faculty, see Compl.
12 ¶¶ 39-81, 90, the very factors decried as intrusive and entangling in *Weaver*. 534 F.3d at
13 1261-66. The Establishment Clause does not permit courts to determine whether an
14 organization is too “sectarian.”
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18 **E. Invalidating the ESA Program would create conflict with the Equal
19 Protection Clause.**

20 The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment subjects laws to strict scrutiny if
21 they interfere with a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class. *City of*
22 *Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center*, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985). Not
23 only is religion a suspect class, see *United States v. Batchelder*, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S. Ct.
24 2198, 2205 n.9 (1979) (“The Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforcement “based
25 upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”);
26 *Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone*, 600 F.3d 1301, 1322 n.10 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Religion is a suspect
27 classification”), but religious rights are fundamental. See, e.g., *Johnson v. Robison*, 415 U.S.
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2 361, 375, 94 S. Ct. 1160, 1169 n.14 (1974) (“Unquestionably, the free exercise of religion is
3 a fundamental constitutional right.”); *Niemotko v. State of Md.*, 340 U.S. 268, 272, 71 S. Ct.
4 325, 328 (1951) (Equal Protection Clause bars government decision based on a “City
5 Council’s dislike for or disagreement with the [Jehovah’s] Witnesses or their views”).
6 Because they openly discriminate between Catholics and Protestants, and against religious
7 groups generally, Blaine Amendments violate the Equal Protection Clause.
8

9 Just as vestigial Jim Crow laws may not be relied on to prohibit political speech and
10 enable discrimination, Nevada may not rely on constitutional provisions enacted out of
11 religious animus in order to discriminate among religious believers today. In *Hunter v.*
12 *Underwood*, for example, the United States Supreme Court considered a facially neutral state
13 constitutional provision. 471 U.S. 222, 232-33, 105 S. Ct. 1916, 1922-23 (1985). The Court
14 held that even without a showing of specific purpose of individual lawmakers, it could rely
15 on the undisputed historical backdrop of the law—in particular, the fact that “the Alabama
16 Constitutional Convention of 1901 was part of a movement that swept the post-
17 Reconstruction South to disenfranchise blacks.” *Id.* at 228-29, 105 S. Ct. at 1920. Thus,
18 “where both impermissible racial motivation and racially discriminatory impact [were]
19 demonstrated” the state constitutional provision violated the Equal Protection Clause. *Id.* at
20 232, 105 S. Ct. at 1922.
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22 Similarly, Nevada’s Blaine Amendment and its Common Schools provision were very
23 much “part of a movement that swept the [United States] to [discriminate against Catholics.]”
24 See *supra* Parts I.A & I.B. Nor is it any defense to argue that there is no discriminatory intent
25 towards Catholics today. As *Hunter* explained, “[w]ithout deciding whether [the challenged
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2 section of the Alabama constitution] would be valid if enacted today without any
3 impermissible motivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was motivated by a
4 desire to discriminate . . . and the section continues to this day to have that effect. As such,
5 it violates equal protection” 471 U.S. at 233, 105 S. Ct. at 1922 (emphasis added). As
6 in Hunter, the original enactment of the Blaine Amendment and the Common Schools
7 provision was motivated by a desire to discriminate against Catholics, and today has a
8 discriminatory effect on Catholic religious schools, as well as those of other faiths.
9

10 **II. Invalidating the ESA Program would create conflict with both the Nevada**
11 **Constitution’s Ordinance and its Enabling Act.**

12 Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Blaine Amendment would also require a violation of both
13 the state’s Ordinance and its Enabling Act. The terms of the Ordinance state that the terms
14 of the Ordinance cannot be altered “without the consent of the United States and the people
15 of the State of Nevada.” Nev. Const. Ordinance. Yet Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Blaine
16 Amendment and the Common Schools provision would do just that—work an amendment
17 of the terms of the Nevada Constitution. Since the other terms of the Nevada Constitution
18 cannot be construed to amend or to conflict with the Ordinance, any such interpretation must
19 be invalid.
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21 The Ordinance of the Nevada Constitution states: “That perfect toleration of religious
22 sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant of said state shall ever be molested, in person
23 or property, on account of his or her mode of religious worship.” Nev. Const. Ordinance.
24 This language is required by Nevada’s Enabling Act. As a condition of Nevada’s statehood,
25 Congress required the state to hold a constitutional convention. Nevada Enabling Act of
26 1864, Pub. L. 38-30, § 3, 13 Stat. 30, 31 (1864). That convention would both ratify the
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2 constitution of the United States and create a state constitution for Nevada. Id. The text of
3 the Ordinance was one of only three provisions that Congress required the state to include,
4 and the Enabling Act and Ordinance cannot be altered without the consent of both the people
5 of Nevada and the United States. Id. Thus, the Ordinance trumps later constitutional
6 amendments. Cf. *Gladden Farms, Inc. v. State*, 129 Ariz. 516, 518, 633 P.2d 325, 327 (1981)
7 (“The Enabling Act is one of the fundamental laws of the State of Arizona and is superior to
8 the Constitution of the State of Arizona, in that neither the Arizona Constitution nor laws
9 enacted pursuant thereto may be in conflict.”).

11 The Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Blaine Amendment would result in a violation of the
12 Ordinance and Enabling Act in two ways. First, the Plaintiffs’ claims conflict with the
13 “perfect toleration of religious sentiment,” since they single out institutions deemed “too
14 religious” to participate in the ESA Program on the basis of their ownership, teaching, or
15 employment criteria. This would impermissibly discriminate among religions in a manner
16 inconsistent with the “perfect toleration” mandated by the Ordinance. Second, Plaintiffs’
17 claims conflict with the requirement that “no inhabitant . . . shall ever be molested in . . .
18 property, on account of his or her mode of religious worship.” If the ESA Program is
19 interpreted to prohibit citizens from using their funds at schools deemed too ‘sectarian,’ then
20 they will be deprived of the full enjoyment of property on account of their decision to attend
21 a religious school of their choosing. Thus, the Blaine Amendment must be interpreted in a
22 way that does not create distinctions between acceptable religious schools and unacceptable,
23 “sectarian” schools.
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2 Moreover, for the reasons stated above, the Blaine Amendment, since it was an
3 amendment to the original constitution, would be void ab initio if its real meaning was to
4 enshrine anti-Catholic and anti-religious discrimination in the Nevada Constitution, in square
5 violation of the Ordinance.

6
7 **CONCLUSION**

8 The Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint.

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11 DATED this 26th day of October 2015.

12 ASHCRAFT & BARR | LLP

13
14 /s Jeffrey F. Barr
15 JEFFREY F. BARR, ESQ.
16 barrj@AshcraftBarr.com
17 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 800
18 Las Vegas, NV 89102
19 Attorney for Amicus Curiae

20 ASHCRAFT & BARR | LLP
21 JEFFREY F. BARR, ESQ.
22 Nevada Bar No. 7269
23 barrj@AshcraftBarr.com
24 2300 West Sahara Avenue
25 Suite 800
26 Las Vegas, NV 89102
27 Telephone: (702) 631.7555
28 Facsimile: (702) 631.7556

ERIC C. RASSBACH, ESQ.*
erassbach@becketfund.org
LORI H. WINDHAM, ESQ.**
lwindham@becketfund.org
DIANA M. VERM, ESQ.**
dverm@becketfund.org

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1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW, Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20036
Attorneys for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
*Pro Hac Vice application forthcoming
**Pro Hac Vice applications pending

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned does certify that on the 26th Day of October 2015, the foregoing Amicus Brief was served by way of the Eighth Judicial District’s Wiznet online E-File & Serve Program on the following:

/s Jeffrey F. Barr
An employee of ASHCRAFT & BARR